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Domestic Relations
By LOUISE GRAHAM* AD JANET JAKUBOWICZ**
In the decade since Kentucky's adoption of the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act (UMDA),' appellate domestic relations
opinions have focused primarily upon property division and child
custody.2 Recent decisions continue this emphasis but also ad-
dress problems regarding the marital relationship, spousal main-
tenance, and child support.
I. DIVORCE VENUE
Kentucky's divorce venue statute, enacted in 1852, places
venue in the county of the wife's residence whether she is the
plaintiff or defendant. 3 Despite major reforms in Kentucky's di-
vorce laws, 4 the divorce venue provisions remain unchanged.
The constitutionality of the venue statute was challenged in
1981 in Hummeldorf v. Hummeldorf.5 In Hummeldorf, the hus-
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1977, Univer-
sity of Texas.
J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky.
Act of Mar. 25, 1972, 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 182, §§ 1-27 (codified at Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 403.010, 403.110-.350 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]). See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1982).
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act [hereinafter cited as UMDA] has also
been adopted in the following jurisdictions: Arizona (AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-311 to
-339 (1976)); Colorado (CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -113, 14-10-101 to -133 (1973))
(Colorado has not adopted the provisions of the Act dealing with Effective Date and Re-
pealer); Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101 to 707 (Smith-Hurd 1980)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-101 to -404, 40-4-101 to -221 (1981)).
2 For previous domestic relations law surveys, see Crone, Domestic Relations, 69
KY. L.J. 581 (1980-81); Harris & Donoho, Domestic Relations, 68 Ky. L.J. 753 (1979-80);
Wilson, Domestic Relations, 65 Ky. L.J. 383 (1976-77).
3 Revised Statutes of Kentucky, ch. 47, art. III, § 4 (1860) (codified at KRS §
452.470 (1975)). See note 7 infra for the text of this provision.
4 The Kentucky divorce act is modeled after the divorce, maintenance, and child
custody provisions of the UMDA. See KRS §§ 403.010, 403.110-.350 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
For an extensive discussion of the new divorce laws, see Note, Kentucky's New Dissolution
ofMarriage Law, 61 Ky. L.J. 980 (1972-73); Comment, Kentucky Divorce Reform, 12 J.
Ftm. L. 109 (1972-73).
5 616 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
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band filed for divorce in Boone County, although his wife and
children resided in adjacent Kenton County. 6 The Boone County
Circuit Court, relying on Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) sec-
tion 452.470,7 dismissed the divorce action for improper venue. 8
The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that
the statute was so "patently unequal and ... unjust" that it vi-
olated both the equal protection clauseP and the Kentucky Con-
stitution.'1 Noting that a statutory classification based on gender
must serve legitimate state objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those legislative objectives," the
court found that there was no valid justification "for continuing
to give a resident wife the home court advantage in divorce ac-
tions."'1 1 In dicta, the court asserted that a divorce venue statute
allowing an action to be brought in the county where the parties
last resided before separation would withstand an equal protec-
tion challenge.13
No justification exists for retaining a divorce venue statute
produced by women's lack of social, economic, and political
power in the mid-nineteenth century. 4 Women's status has
8 Id. at 796.
7 KRS § 452.470 (1975) provides: "An action for alimony or divorce must be
brought in the county where the wife usually resides, if she have [sic] an actual residence
in'thit state; if not, in the county ofthe hlifbancs residence.
8 616 S.W.2d at 798.
9 Id. at 797. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, para. 1 provides in pertinent part: "No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of cit-
izens of the United States... nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."
10 616 S.W.2d at 797. Ky. CONST. § 2 states: "Absolute and arbitrary power over the
lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest
majority."
' See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down laws imposing alimony obliga-
tionson husbands but not wives); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down
Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2% beer to males under
the age of 21 while allowing sale to females between the ages of 18 and 21).
12 616 S.W.2d at 797.
13 Id. Two states have adopted this type of venue statute. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
208, § 6 (MichielLaw. Co-op. 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-60 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
11 The following excerpt illustrates the social and legal environment of women in the
nineteenth century:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family or-
[Vol. 70
1981-82] SURvEY-DoMEsTIc RELATIONS
changed, is and Kentucky's marriage and divorce laws generally
reflect this change. 6 The venue statute was an anamoly in light
of the new laws.
While the appellee did not argue that women continue to
need protection, she did assert that venue equalization could
cause other problems. Judge McDonald, writing for a majority of
the court in Hummeldorf, rejected the argument that equalizing
the venue provision would result in a "race to the courthouse."'' 7
Rather, "it would merely change the character of the existing
race" since the statute, in the past, had fostered a wife's race to
establish a residency. 18
ganization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the na-
ture of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs
to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say iden-
tity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family in-
stitution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and inde-
pendent career from that of her husband....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic]
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
For a comprehensive discussion of the rationale of the Kentucky divorce venue sta-
tute, see Comment, The Kentucky Divorce Venue Statute: A Callfor Reform, 66 Ky. L.J.
724 (1977-78).
15 In 1979, 64% of all American women between-the ages of 25 and 34 were in the
work force. By 1980, over 40% of mothers with children under the age of three were
either in the work force or seeking work. Sawyer, Women Increase Share of Jobs in Just
About Every Profession, The Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 10, 1981, at C8, col. 1
(statewide ed.).
The UMDA has eroded the traditional grounds for divorce:
[T]he sole basis for dissolution under the new Act is irretrievable break-
down. [KES § 403.170 (Cum. Supp. 1980).]
The new Act also provides that either spouse may receive maintenance
support [KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1980)], while under previous law only
the wife had such a right. [KRS § 403.060 (1972) (repealed 1972).] This Act
has also equalized the division of property provisions. Today, it is the party
most deserving of financial support who will receive it [KRS § 403.190
(Cum. Supp. 1980)]; no longer is there the presumption that the wife alone
is the party in need. [KBS § 403.060 (1970) (repealed 1972).]
Comment, supra note 14, at 728-29.
The purpose of the Kentucky divorce act is to make the divorce laws "effective for
dealing with the realities of matrimonial experience." KRS § 403.110 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
17 616 S.W.2d at 797.
18 Id. See Gross v. Ward, 386 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1965). In Gross, the term "residence"
is defined as the wife's actual residence rather than her legal residence. Id. at 457. The
Gross interpretation has engendered problems in ascertaining a wife's intent to establish
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In the absence of a specific divorce venue statute, an action
for dissolution may now be initiated in the county where either
litigant resides.19 Until the legislature adopts a new statutese the
Hummeldorf decision provides the circuit courts with guidance
in determining the proper forum. According to Hummeldorf,
whether a court should assume jurisdiction of a divorce action
depends upon: "(1) the county of the parties' marital residence
prior to separation; (2) the usual residence of the children, if any;
[and] (3) accessibility of witnesses and the economy of offering
proof."21 If circuit courts adhere to these guidelines, it will be
more difficult for either spouse to initiate a last minute change of
residency immediately prior to filing for divorce in order to se-
cure some perceived advantage.22
II. MARITAL PROPERTY
Both statistical information and common sense indicate the
an "actual residence." See, e.g., Martin v. Fuqua, 439 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1976) (wife
moved to new county only one day prior to filing divorce, but was considered a resident of
that county); Calhoun v. Peek, 419 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1967) (seven days considered suffi-
cient to demonstrate wife's intent to establish residence in Calloway County although wife
was employed in Trigg County and children attended school there); Whitaker v. Bradley,
349 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1961) (four days sufficient to establish new residence); Brumfield v.
Baxter, 210 S.W.2d 975 (Ky. 1948) (six days sufficient to establish residency). See also
Burke v. Tartar, 350 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1961). In Burke, the husband won the race by filing
his divorce action at 9:30 a.m. while his wife, then in transit to her new residence, filed
later that same day.
19 Hummeldorf v. Hummeldorf, 616 S.W.2d at 797. For a discussion of proposals to
change the divorce venue statute making suit proper in the county where either party re-
sides, see Fortune, Venue of Civil Action in Kentucky, 60 Ky. L.J. 497, 500 (1971-72);
Comment, supra note 14, at 470.
1 Kentucky does not have a general civil venue statute. See KBS §§ 452.400-.505
(1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980).
21 616 S.W.2d at 798. These factors were first enunciated in Shumaker v. Paxton,
613 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Ky. 1981). See notes 122-44 infra and the accompanying text for a
discussion of jurisdiction in child custody disputes.
2 In determining venue in child custody cases, the UNIFoRM QumLD CusToDY Jums-
DICTION AT, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UCCJA], is often applied by anal-
ogy. See KRS §§ 403.400-.630 (Cum. Supp. 1980). On a jurisdictional level, a court as-
suming jurisdiction must either be in the home state of the child, or the child and at least
one parent must have a significant connection with the state. KES § 403.420(1)(a)-(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1980). Logically it would seem that in choosing between counties within a
state, that county in which most of the evidence regarding the child's interpersonal rela-
tionships is available should adjudicate child custody.
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importance of the economic aspect of divorce. 23 Its importance is
confirmed by widespread litigation concerning the status of as-
sets as marital or separate property for purposes of division. Two
frequent problems involve the property status of a professional li-
cense or degree and the property status of a government benefit.
Additionally, state statutes that require consideration of such
factors as a spouse's contribution as a homemaker 4 or that man-
date apportionment of an asset's increased value between marital
and separate property have introduced new considerations into
divorce litigation.
Under the Kentucky divorce statute, a trial court distributing
property upon dissolution of a marriage must distinguish be-
tween separate property, which is assigned entirely to the owner
spouse, and marital property, which is available for distribution
between the spouses.23 Recent cases decided under this statute
cover four important topics: the extent to which one spouse who
aids the other in acquiring a professional degree or license has a
right to have that contribution considered upon divorce; the di-
visibility of federally-created benefits; proper characterization of
income from separate property as marital or separate property;
and correct division of property acquired prior to the marriage
but subject to a mortgage that was reduced duriAg the marriage.
A. Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses
One of the most conceptually difficult problems facing di-
23 In 1975, there were over 1,026,000 divorces, thereby creating nearly a million
new "economic units." Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, and Excessive
Modifications, 65 CALIF. L. BEv. 978, 979 (1977).
24 KRS S 403.190(1)(a) (Cum; Supp. 1980) provides that such contribution must be
considered as part of the spouse's contribution to marital property. Over 27 other states
recognize the contributions of a spouse as homemaker in determining maintenance and/or
property distribution. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM.
L.Q. 229,246 (1981).
21 KRS § 403.190(2)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides that the increase in the value of
property acquired before marriage is nonmarital property unless due to "efforts of the par-
ties during marriage." For a discussion of this provision in relation to the Sousley case, see
notes 73-86 infra and the accompanying text.
26 KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See note 72 infra for a description of the sec-
tion's requirements.
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vorce courts today proceeds from the "educational partnership"
marriage.27 In such a marriage one spouse provides support for
the other, enabling him or her to complete a graduate or profes-
sional education. The typical case involves parties who are di-
vorced shortly after the graduate or professional spouse receives
the degree. The provider spouses in these marriages cannot ex-
pect to receive maintenance since they are self-supporting. s
Often the parties to such a marriage have accumulated little or
no marital property. As a result, in increasing numbers, the pro-
vider spouses have argued that their contribution to their spouse's
education should be recognized by a property award.29
' See generally Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the Realization of Educational
Goals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 947; Note, Family Law:
Ought a Professional Degree Be Divisible as Property Upon Divorce?, 22 WM. & MARY L.
Rv. 517 (1981); Comment, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Disso-
lutions, 64 IowA L. REv. 705 (1979).
2 Having supported the couple during the marriage, or at least during the educa-
tional period, the working spouse cannot now make a compelling case for maintenance
support. Harris & Donoho, supra note 2, at 755 n.10. See KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp.
1980) (setting out requirements for maintenance awards). See note 40 infra for part of the
text of KRS § 403.200.
For a pragmatic analysis of the makings of an "educational partnership" mar-
riage, see Greer, Dissolution of the "Educational Partnership" Marriage, 4 FLA. B.J. 292
(1981).
A cursory examination of articles on this topic reveals no reported cases where the
husband, after working to support the wife in her educational endeavors, sued for division
of her degree as marital property.
2 See, e.g., Moss v. Moss, 264 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (alimony award of
$15,000 to compensate wife for contributions to husband's medical education); Lynn v.
Lynn, [1980-81] 7 FAM. L. REe. (BNA) 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dee. 5, 1980)
(medical degree was a marital asset with a value of $308,886); Daniels v. Daniels, 185
N.E.2d 773 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961) (court, in dictum, recognized medical license as marital
property); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (permanent alimony
award for wife's contributions to husband's increased earning capacity). Contra Mahoney
v. Mahoney, No. A-491-80-T2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 9, 1982) (available June 7,
1982, on LEXIS, States library, N.J. file). See also In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d
75, 78 (Colo. 1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 753
(Okla. 1979) (Lavender, J., dissenting).
A majority of courts addressing the issue have refused to treat an educational li-
cense or degree as part of the marital estate. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131
(1969) (law degree is not community property); In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75
(neither educational degree nor increased earning capacity derived therefrom is marital
property); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (while law degree
is not marital property, future earning capacity engendered by law degree is marital prop-
erty); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (medical license is not marital property);
1981-82] SURVEY-DoMESTc RELATIONS
In 1979 the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Inman v. In-
man,30 placed Kentucky among those states holding that a profes-
sional license or degree could be treated as marital property un-
der limited circumstances. 3' John and Sue Inman had been mar-
ried for seventeen years. John was a dentist; Sue was a teacher.
When their marriage was dissolved they were on the brink of
bankruptcy.32 The Inman trial court initially awarded Sue In-
man most of the cohple's marital property and awarded John In-
man the bulk of the indebtedness. 3 That distribution was based
Dewitt v. Dewitt, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (neither law degree nor license
constitutes marital property).
One problem noted by the Colorado Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Graham,
is the inapplicability of "pure" property concepts to educational degrees. The court stated:
[The degree] does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
value on an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death
of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged .... It is simply an intellectual achievement that may
potentially assist in the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has
none of the attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.
574 P.2d at 77.
30 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded this case to the trial court, from which it was again appealed to the court of ap-
peals. Inman v. Inman, No. 81-CA-936-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1982). See note 36 in-
fra for a discussion of this second Inman opinion by the court of appeals.
31 It should be noted that, prior to the Inman decision, no jurisdiction had held an
educational degree and/or license to be marital property; Rather, the "courts [evaded] the
issue semantically by incorporating an amount into alimony or maintenance that [pur-
ported] to reflect the wife's contributions to the husband's attainment of increased earning
capacity." 1979 WASH. L.Q. 1175, 1178. See note 29 supra for a review of court decisions
on this issue.
Kentucky's property distribution statute provides in part that the court "shall di-
vide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions con-
sidering all relevant factors." KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980). To date, a total of 40
states have similar equitable distribution statutes. See Freed & Foster, supra note 24, at
250-51.
In the five jurisdictions which follow the common law rule, the courts have no
equitable powers to distribute the property of the parties since title alone controls. Thus,
the issue of whether a professional license or degree is marital property is inapplicable in
the following "title" states: Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia. Id. at 249. In light of recent decisions in both Florida and South Carolina, however,
it is possible that these states will now be considered equitable distribution states. See
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Simmons v. Simmons, 267 S.E.2d 427 (S.C. 1980).
The remaining nine states are community property states. Freed & Foster, supra
note 24, at 249.
32 578 S.W.2d at 267.
33 Id. at 267, 271.
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upon the trial court's assumption that John Inman's license to
practice dentistry could be marital property.s The court of ap-
peals upheld the classification, warning that it did so only under
the narrow circumstances presented by Inman. '5 The court held
that the provider spouse could recover the amount spent for di-
rect support and school expenses during the period of education,
plus reasonable adjustments for inflation, when three conditions
were met: (1) one spouse had aided the other in the acquisition of
a professional degree; (2) no significant marital property had
been accumulated; and (3) the spouse not holding the degree was
not entitled to maintenance.-" Because these conditions were met
in Inman, the court treated the professional degree as marital
property.
More recently, in Leveck v. Leveck,17 the court of appeals
confirmed that the Inman holding is confined to the circum-
stances that produced that case. Terrence and Judith Leveck
were married for eleven years. Judith worked as a nurse during
the first three years of Terrence's medical education. The trial
court found that Judith provided most of the funds to support the
couple from the inception of their marriage until the end of Ter-
rence's third year of medical school.3s For the next seven and a
half years, Terrence supported his family with his Army salary.
The parties accumulated no substantial property other than Ter-
rence's degree. 39 The trial court awarded Judith $10,000 lump
34Id. at 267.
3 Id. at 270. The court of appeals reasoned that the degreed spouse would receive "a
windfall of contribution to his or her increased earning capacity" if the nondegree holding
spouse was not compensated for the contribution. Id. at 268. However, the court ex-
pressed its concern that "placing a professional license in the category of marital proper-
ty ... can only create another field for battle in the already complex and delicate area of
division of marital property." Id. at 268.36 Id. at 269. In Inman v. Inman, No. 81-CA-936-MR, slip op. at 3 (Ky. Ct. App.
Mar. 12, 1982), the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that the increased earning ca-
pacify derived from a license should not be considered when computing the supporting
spouse's interest. "To award a contributing spouse a share of increased earning capacity
would require the benefitted spouse to continue in that or a comparable wage earning po-
sition," factors which are much too subjective and speculative. Id. Cf. Moss v. Moss, No.
81-CA-571-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1982).
37 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).




sum maintenance0 and periodic maintenance of $400 per month
based on the following findings: (1) that Judith was unable to
support herself through appropriate employment because of a
physical disability; (2) that she was required to stay at home with
her children; and (3) that there was insufficient marital property
to provide for her reasonable needs. 41 Judith appealed, claiming
that the trial court had erred in failing to find Terrence's medical
license to be divisible marital property. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court award, stating that it would not
broaden the Inman holding.42
Although the court of appeals pointedly refused to extend the
Inman rule, it noted without criticism that the $10,000 lump
sum maintenance awarded to Judith Leveck by the trial court in-
cluded compensation for her investment in Terrence Leveck's
medical degree. 43 The appellate court's failure to criticize the
trial court's maintenance award raises two questions. The first
arises from the statutory standards for an award of maintenance.
Those standards provide that a spouse must lack sufficient prop-
erty to provide for his or her reasonable needs and be unable to
support himself or herself through appropriate employment in
order to receive maintenance. 44 A request for maintenance,
40 Id. at 712. KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1980) lists the requirements for mainten-
ance support:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or a
proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of a marriage by a court
which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may
grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse
seeking maintenance:
(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to
him, to provide for his reasonable needs; and
(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the
custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate
that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the house.
KRS § 403.200(1)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
The statute requires that both subsections, (a) and (b), be met before a trial court
can award maintenance support.
41 614 S.W.2d at 712-13. See Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071. For further discus-
sion of maintenance support, see notes 43-51 infta and the accompanying text.
42 614 S.W.2d at 712.
43 Id.
44 Id. Accord Moss v. Moss, 264 N.W.2d 97; Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071.
Judge Wilhoit, in his dissenting opinion from the first Inman decision, argued that
1981-82]
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therefore, is grounded in the needs of a particular spouse. Yet, re-
imbursing a spouse for an investment in the other spouse's degree
or license is not necessarily connected to the needs of the invest-
ing spouse. In fact, simultaneous reimbursement for an educa-
tional contribution and consideration of the statutory standards
for maintenance could provide double compensation.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has confirmed that the main-
tenance standards45 reflect a status principle. What is reasonable
or appropriate maintenance depends upon the kind of lifestyle
held by the spouses during the marriage. 4 Thus, in some cases,
the spouse of an individual with an advanced education or a pro-
fessional degree may receive a higher maintenance award be-
cause of the couple's more affluent lifestyle and the ability of the
spouse holding the professional or graduate degree to pay. 47 A
trial court which awards maintenance on that status basis and
also orders reimbursement for a spousal contribution to a license
or degree potentially compensates the non-degree holding spouse
twice. Such a spouse receives the benefits of the degree through a
higher maintenance award and is also reimbursed for helping to
acquire the degree.
The second question arises from the court's characterization
of Judith Leveck's maintenance award. If Judith recovered her
investment in Terrence's education through the lump sum main-
a more equitable result would have been to award Mrs. Inman maintenance payments.
He noted that the" 'standard of living established during the marriage" provision of sub-
section (2)(c) [KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1980)] is to be considered in determining whe-
ther a spouse is able to support himself." 578 S.W.2d at 271 (quoting Casper v. Casper,
510 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1974)). Although Mrs. Inman was capable of supporting herself, she
could not support herself at the same level to which she was accustomed. 578 S.W.2d at
271.
As pointed out by one commentator, this standard is of little value when the
couple's standard of living is low (which it generally is when a spouse is attending school),
or the couple's standard of living is deceptive (as it was in Inman.) See DOMESTIC LAW-
DIVORCE-KENTUCKY INCLUDES LICENSE TO PRACTICE DENTISTRY IN MARITAL PROPERTY,
1979 WASH. L.Q. 1175, 1181 ri.32.
45 See note 40 supra for a brief discussion of the applicable portions of KRS § 403.200
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
48 KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp. 1980).47 Accord Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253 (ex-wife, although employed, unable to
maintain self to standard of living established during the marriage; award of maintenance
to ex-wife upheld). See Harris & Donoho, supra note 2, at 755-56 for a discussion of the
methods of valuing a professional degree.
[Vol. 70
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tenance award, she actually received the same compensation as
Sue Inman, whether or not the court labelled the degree "marital
property." For that reason, it seems inappropriate for the court
to distinguish between the two cases. The fact that Sue Inman re-
covered under the guise of a property award while Judith Leveck
recovered through lump sum maintenance may have tax implica-
tions 8 or an effect upon the award's modifiability, 49 but it has
little other significance. Both women were in fact compensated
for their investments. Furthermore, compensation through
maintenance violates an express limitation of Inman since Sue In-
man's award was based, in part, upon the fact that she was ineli-
gible for maintenance. If maintenance awards such as the one re-
ceived by Judith Leveck become typical, the distinction between
cases like Leveck and Inman may turn out to have no practical
significance.
Although the Leveck decision raises problems with regard to
maintenance, it does clarify the basis of the court's ruling in In-
man. The Inman decision permitted John Inman's professional
license to be treated as marital property. However, the decision
was based on the flexible and equitable nature of divorce adjudi-
cation rather than on an expanded notion of property for divorce
purposes. Thus, the major difference between Sue Inman and
Judith Leveck is that Sue Inman was in danger of "walk[ing]
away empty-handed from a marriage to which she had made
substantial contributions"e and Judith Leveck was not. The
court of appeal's focus on the relative "empty-handedness" of the
two women emphasizes that Inman merely permitted treatment
of the license or degree as marital property because of the
equities of the case, rather than holding that such an asset is al-
48 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980) (Court affirmed
maintenance award in amount of mortgage payment due on property allocated to nonsup-
porting spouse, shifting tax benefit of interest deductions to the nonsupporting spouse).
Spouses who pay maintenance may deduct those payments from their income. I.R.C. §§
71,215 (1981). No similar deduction is available for property settlements. For a discussion
of the tax implications of divorce, see FooTE, LEVY & SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW 916-35 (2d ed. 1976).
49 An award of maintenance may be modified upon a showing of changed circum-
stances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms of the prior award unconscion-
able. KRS § 403.250(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
so Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d at 269.
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ways marital property. 51
The difference between a rule that an educational degree is
marital property and that it may be treated as marital property is
more than mere semantics. It signals extreme caution on the part
of Kentucky appellate courts. If a degree may be property in one
case but not in another, the rule allowing compensation is based
more firmly in equity notions than in property definitions. The
actual award received by Sue Inman bore no relationship to a
property division of the degree. It was intended by the court to
alleviate an inequitable situation. Recognition that the basis for
an Inman award is equity makes clear that Kentucky courts are
unlikely to extend the holding of Inman in the near future.
B. Military Benefits
When educational degrees and professional licenses are in-
volved in a divorce, courts must determine whether those assets
possess sufficient property characteristics to be recognized in al-
locating assets accumulated during the marriage. Government
benefits present other problems.5 2 Although government benefits
may be more easily recognized as property,0 federal laws creat-
ing the benefits often prevent some benefits from being classified
as marital property. Further limitations derive from state mar-
ital property law.
Military retirement benefits have recently joined railroad re-
tirement benefits as federally-created property rights not subject
51 Id. at 266. See Harris & Donoho, supra note 2, at 753, 755. For a discussion of the
equitable distribution of marital property, see note 31 supra and the accompanying text.
52 The rise in divorce litigation concerning government benefits reflects not only the
rising divorce rate, but also the increase in federal government outlays for income security
benefits. Between 1970 and 1979, the total federal expenditure for such benefits increased
from nearly 160 million to $200 million. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 334 (101st ed. 1980). Of the 1979
expenditures, social security accounted for over $100 milion. Id.
Veteran's benefits and military retirement payments each accounted for approx-
imately $10 million. Id.
'3 Government benefits have long been recognized as property for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Indeed, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals in Inman relied upon the Supreme Court's treatment of such assets
as property, in explaining its view that the term "property" may be given various mean-
ings, depending upon the statutory context in which the term is used. 578 S.W.2d at 269.
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to division under state community property laws. In 1979 in His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo,54 the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that a statutory anti-assignment clause prevented division
of railroad retirement benefits as community property. In 1981
in McCarty v. McCarty,s the Court held that the division of mil-
itary retirement benefits under community property principles
could not be permitted because that division threatened clear
and substantial federal interests. 6 The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals had considered a similar case, Russell v. Russell,57 in 1980
and held military retirement benefits were separate property
under the Kentucky marital property statute. Thus McCarty
does not change the outcome of Kentucky divorce settlements,
but it demonstrates the trend toward increased federal control
over the classification of benefits derived from federal sources.
The McCarty Court concluded that allowing division of mil-
itary retirement benefits as marital property would threaten the
substantial interests of the federal government in the manage-
ment of its active military personnel. In support of this conclu-
sion the Court relied heavily upon a perceived Congressional in-
tention that military retirement benefits remain the "personal
entitlement" of military personnel. 59 That perception was de-
rived from the following statutory features: (1) service personnel
are permitted to designate the beneficiaries to receive unpaid
portions upon their death; (2) service personnel may but are not
4 439 U.S. 572 (1979). The Kentucky Court of Appeals used Hisquierdo as prece-
dent in Frost v. Frost, 581 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). In addition to railroad retire-
ment benefits and military retirement pay, the United States Supreme Court has pre-
empted state marital property law on only four other occasions. See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos,
376 U.S. 306 (1964) (federal treasury regulations governing U.S. Savings Bonds override
state community property rules governing disposition upon the death of one of the
spouses); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (federal treasury regulations governing U.S.
Savings Bonds overridestate intestacy rules); Wissner v. Wisner, 338 U.S.'665 (1950) (Na-
tional Servicemen's Life Insurance Act permitting service personnel to designate benefi-
ciary takes precedence over state community property rule allocating one-half of the pro-
ceeds to surviving spouse); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905) (Federal Homestead Act
allowing surviving spouse to patent homestead claim takes precedence over state commu-
nity property law designating surviving child as partial owner of claim).
M 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).5 6 Id. at 2741-42.
57 605 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
58 101 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
59 Id. at 2741.
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required to provide an annuity for a spouse; and (3) widows are
deliberately favored over divorced spouses. 60
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in McCarty, argued that
none of the features cited by the majority satisfied the Hisquierdo
requirement of an express prohibition of division of a benefit.61
This argument has particular force. The statute involved in His-
quierdo expressly prohibited assignment or attachment of the
benefit except to satisfy maintenance and child support obliga-
tions.62 The prohibition in McCarty, on the other hand, is in-
ferred from Congressional silence on the issue.0 It appears,
therefore, that the Court in McCarty has gone a step beyond the
requirements of Hisquierdo. Additionally, the federal interest
deemed substantial in McCarty-an interest in personnel man-
agement-is an interest that may undergird almost any federal
program. 6 McCarty thus signals that almost any identifiable fed-
eral interest may be sufficient to preclude division of federal
benefits.
In Kentucky, state marital property law independently limits
benefit divisibility.6 5 In McGlone v. McGlone,6 the Kentucky
10 Id. at 2737-38.
61 Id. at 2743 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62 The anti-assignment clause involved in Hisquierdo was 45 U.S.C. § 2 31m (1976).
The section provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State,
territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity
shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or
other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the pay-
ment thereof be anticipated ....
Although the anti-attachment statute provides for no exceptions, Congress enacted an ex-
ception to all federal benefit plans to permit attachment to satisfy legal obligations for
child support or alimony. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). Alimony is defined to exclude property
divisions between spouses. 42 U.S.C. § 462(c) (1976).
6 101 S. Ct. at 2743 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although McCarty prohibits divi-
sion of military retirement benefits, some divorced persons will receive social security
based on the contributions of thair fo6imer milithry spouses. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)-()
(1976).
64 101 S. Ct. at 2741-42.
65 Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in McCarty and Hisquierdo,
some states recognized the separate property nature of non-compensatory governmental
benefits. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (dis-
ability pension is veteran's separate property).
66 613 S.W.2d 419 (Ky. 1981).
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Supreme Court held that the value of a Veteran's Administration
grant awarded for the purpose of constructing a home designed
for a veteran confined to a wheelchair would not be considered
divisible property because it was a "gift" and as such excluded
from the statutory definition of "marital property" in KRS sec-
tion 403.190(2).67 The Court first found that the plain language
of the veteran's benefit legislation indicated that such grants
were not entitlements for military service. 8 Rather, the legisla-
tion authorized the Veterans Administration to make the grants
in its discretion. 9 Secondly, the Court defined the term "gift" in
the common law sense for purposes of the statutory exclusion
from marital property. 7° Because the grant was a gift, it was non-
divisible.
Although the Court in McGlone looked to the federal statute
authorizing the benefit to determine the benefit's nature, once
the benefit was determined to be a gift, the Court looked to state
law to determine whether the gift was marital or separate prop-
erty. Thus, the decision in McGlone rests independently upon
the state law characterization of a gift as separate property
67 KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980). For the provisions of this section, see note 72
infra.
6 613 S.W.2d at 420.
69 Id.
70 The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the Kentucky Court of Appeals' reliance on
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960), to resolve whether a grant was a gift or
not. In Duberstein, the United States Supreme Court, quoting language from prior deci-
sions, stated: "A gift in the statutory sense... proceeds from a 'detached and disinter-
ested generosity'... 'out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like im-
pulses.'.. . [T]he most critical consideration... is the transferor's 'intention."' Id. at
285-86 (footnotes omitted):
The Kentucky Supreme Court, noting that the term "gift" was not defined in KRS
§403.190 (Gum. Supp. 1980), which governs treatment of property in divorce actions, de-
ferred to its common law meaning: "A 'gift' in a common, ordinary, popular sense is a
voluntary and gratuitous giving of something by one without compensation to another
who takes it without valuable consideration." Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823,
825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (quoting Bowman's Adm'r v. Bowman's Ex'r, 192 S.W.2d 955
(Ky. 1946)).
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rather than upon the supremacy of the federal law creating the
benefit. 71
C. Income From the Sale of a Separate Asset
Kentucky statutes do not specifically characterize income
from separate property as marital or separate property. 72 How-
ever, the Kentucky Supreme Court has ruled that such income is
marital property. In Sousley v. Sousley,73 the Court pointed out
that the statutory designation as separate property of the increase
in value of pre-marital property not due to the joint efforts of the
parties did not apply to income derived from property acquired
before the marriage. 74 Thus, while an increase in value due to
general economic conditions is separate property, income from
the disposition of separate property is marital property. 75
Although the Sousley rule treats income in the manner envi-
sioned by the.drafters of the UMDA,76 the case posed peculiar
71 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) established the rule that
if a case rests upon an independent state ground, the Supreme Court won't consider the
federal ground.
72 KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980), modeled after § 307 of the UMDA, provides
that all property acquired by a spouse after marriage is martial property except:
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage
or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(c) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(d) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(e) The increase in value of property acquired before the marriage to the ex-
tent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during
marriage.
Id. (emphasis added).
KRS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980) also provides that property acquired prior to
the marriage is generally nonmarital, or separate, property.
73 614 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1981).
74 Id. at 943. See Sharp v. Sharp, 491 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1973). In Sharp, the Court
stated that increases in the value of property acquired before the marriage, which are at-
tributable to general economic conditions, are nonmarital and "follow" the property. Id.
at 644. Conversely, if an increase in value results from "team efforts" or "team funds," the
increase is subject to division as marital property. Id. See also Smith v. Smith, 497 S.W.2d
418 (Ky. 1973); Beggs v. Beggs, 479 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1972); Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d
821 (Ky. 1970).
'5 614 S.W.2d at 943.
78 As noted by the Court, the meaning of KRS § 403.190(2)(e) was underscored by
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problems in the application of the rule. During the marriage
both of the Sousleys worked in the operation of the disputed bus-
iness. The business had been created through the use of capital
stock owned by Curtis Sousley prior to the marriage.7 Curtis sold
the stock of the corporation 8 during the marriage and Pamela
Sousley argued that the difference between the value of the cor-
poration as it began and its sale value was attributable to joint ef-
forts and was therefore marital property. 79 The trial court held
that no portion of the increased value was attributable to joint ef-
forts and that the increase in value due solely to economic condi-
tions was separate property.80 The court of appeals found that
the "evidence sustained the findings of the trial court." 81 The
Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review to decide
the legal issue of "whether the income from the sale of a nonmar-
ital asset is marital property within the meaning of KRS
403.190."82
The Supreme Court affirmed the finding by the trial court
and court of appeals that the evidence did not establish that Cur-
tis Sousley had realized a profit on the sale. The Court also
found, however, that if he had realized income from the sale, it
would have been marital property. The Court expressly held
"that income produced from nonmarital property is, in fact,
marital property pursuant to the directives of KRS 403. 190."83
The holding is simple to state but difficult to apply because
the opinion does not make clear exactly what will be considered
income. The Court stated that if Curtis Sousley had realized a
profit on the sale, he would have had income; but the Court in-
the authors of the UMDA: "The phrase, 'increase in value!,... is not intended to cover
the income from property acquired prior to marriage. Such income is marital property.
Similarly, income from nonmarital property acquired after the marriage is marital prop-
erty." UMDA § 307 commissioners' note, 9A U.L.A. 144 (1979) (emphasis added).
77 614 S.W.2d at 943. "[T]he stock of the corporation, including the $30,000 cash in-
fusion [made by Dr. Sousley], was solely the property of Dr. Sousley prior to the marriage
and was, therefore, nonmarital." Id. (citing KRS § 403.190(1) (Cur. Supp. 1980)).





8 Id. at 944.
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plied that it would also be income on the separate theory that
Curtis was an entrepreneur and "[t]his was the way he earned a
living."84 Thus there are two possible interpretations of the Sous-
ley holding. One is that the profitable postmarriage sale of non-
marital capital stock produces income which is always marital
property. Another is that profitable sales by entrepreneurs will
be held to generate income, and, therefore, marital property.
The distinction may be important in determining what income is
marital property. For instance, an individual who is not an en-
trepreneur could sell assets acquired before marriage and retain
as separate property a portion of the assets' increased value be-
cause of a Kentucky rule permitting an asset to be deemed both
marital and separate in proportion to the respective contribu-
tions made by each spouse." An entrepreneur, on the other hand,
would retain none of the increased value as separate property
under the second interpretation of Sousley. Logically, the char-
acter of assets as marital or separate should not depend on the oc-
cupation of one of the spouses, and thus the first interpretation of
Sousley seems preferable. 8
D. Appreciated Property
The Kentucky divorce statute states that property acquired
84 Id. at 43.
85 See the text accompanying notes 87-104 infra for a discussion of the proportional-
ityrule.
86 An important issue, though only briefly discussed in Sousley, is the validity of
antenuptial agreements in Kentucky. The Sousleys had signed. an antenuptial agreement
providing for payment of money upon divorce. 614 S.W.2d at 944. Antenuptial agree-
ments contingent upon divorce are void in Kentucky as against public policy. Stratton v.
Wilson, 185 S.W. 522 (Ky. 1916). Although the Court indicated some displeasure with the
Stratton rule, it declined to decide the current validity of the policy in the context of the
Sousley facts. 614 S.W.2d at 944. More recently, the court of appeals has upheld an ante-
nuptial agreement providing for "decent support" because the agreement made no men-
tion of divorce. Jackson v. Jackson, 626 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
With the rising divorce rate, there is a growing trend in other jurisdictions to al-
low prospective marriage partners to determine their support and property rights. See,
e.g., Spector v. Spector, 531 P.2d 176 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d
381 (Fla. 1970); Volid v. Volid, 286 N.E.2d 42 (IM. App. Ct. 1972); Ferry v. Ferry, 586
S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). For a further discussion on this subject, see Casenote,




before the inception of a marriage is the separate property of the
acquiring spouse. 87 While this rule is simple to apply to some
kinds of property, its application to real property is often compli-
cated by two factors. First, marital funds are often used to re-
duce a mortgage on property purchased prior to marriage. Sec-
ond, real property rarely retains a constant value over a period of
several years.m Both inflation and improvements to the property
may contribute to an increase in its value. 9 In many instances,
these two factors unite to produce appreciated property pur-
chased prior to a marriage, but subject to a mortgage reduced
during marriage.
Kentucky courts have solved the problem of determining
what is "property" at the time of acquisition by defining proper-
ty as equity, and they have solved the problem of dividing up
subsequent appreciation by adopting a proportionate ap-
proach.90 In dealing with the time of acquisition, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has ruled that property means equity.91 Proper-
ty subject to a mortgage is, therefore, acquired before the mar-
riage only to the extent of the equity accumulated by the acquir-
ing spouse. If the mortgage is reduced after the marriage through
the use of marital funds, some portion of the property will be
marital.9 2 The courts' definition of property as equity does not
solve the problem of dividing the value of appreciation. That di-
87 KBS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
88 The Consumer Price Index indicates that in 1980 the average urban consumer was
required to spend 14.8% more to purchase a home than he or she would have spent in
1979. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr
OF THE UNrrED STATES 486 (101st ed. 1980).
89 Conversely, it is at least theoretically possible for real property to decrease in
value. No such decrease has occurred for the last ten years, however. Id.
90 See Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137; Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587 S.W.2d
262 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
Angel v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
9' 569 S.W.2d at 178. The Robinson formula states that the net' equity in... prop-
erty shall be considered nonmarital property at the time of separation in that proportion
which this equity bore to the value of the property at the time of the marriage." Id. at 181.
The spouse claiming nonmarital property in Robinson had paid $19,000 of a $30,000 pur-
chase price at the time of the marriage. Therefore, 19/30th of the property was nonmar-
ital. A mathematical representation of Robinson is:
equity in the property at the time of marriage = nonmarital interest
value of the property at time of marriage
92 Id. at 181.
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vision, which designates increases from joint efforts as marital
property, is statutorily mandated.3
The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed the pro-
priety of a proportionate approach in Brandenburg v. Branden-
burg. 14The Brandenburg trial court had allocated to the hus-
band as separate property certain property purchased by him
prior to the marriage but subject to a mortgage reduced during
the marriage. 95 The appellate court's reversal adopted a propor-
tionate approach.96 The Brandenburg formula, like its predeces-
sors in Robinson v. Robinson"' and Newman v. Newman,98 estab-
lishes ratios between the nonmarital/separate contribution and
the total contribution and between the marital contribution and
the total contribution." For purposes of the formula a separate
contribution is defined as not only the equity in the property at
the time of the marriage, but also any amount expended by
either spouse from traceable, separate funds either to reduce
mortgage principal or to improve the property. 100 Marital contri-
butions are similarly defined to include both mortgage reduc-
tions and any improvements attributable to marital funds. 1'0
Spousal contributions that do not proceed from marital funds,
such as the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker,' 0 2 may not
93 KBS § 403.190(2)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1980). The statute provides that property
which has appreciated due to joint efforts is to be classified as marital, while property that
has appreciated from other causes is separate. Id. In Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d at
139, the Kentucky Supreme Court left standing an application of the Robinson formula to
appreciated property. The Newman formula may be mathematically stated as:
equity in property at the time of marriage X value at = nonmarital
value of the property at time of marriage separation share
94 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
95 Id. at 872.
96 The Brandenburg formula may be mathematically represented as:
nonmarital contribution
total contribution X equity - nonmaritalproperty
marital contribution
total contribution X equity = marital property
97 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
98 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980).
99 Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872.
100 Id.
101 Id.




be counted in determining the marital portion of the property. 10
Rather, such contributions are later considered in determining
each spouse's share of the marital property. 104
Although Brandenburg appears to firmly entrench a propor-
tionate approach for the resolution of marital property disputes
in Kentucky, a concurring opinion by Judge Gudgel raised signif-
icant questions concerning the formula's use. Judge Gudgel first
argued that the majority's formula abandoned formulas pre-
viously approved by the court of appeals. 105 Second, he con-
tended that the majority had misjudged the Kentucky Supreme
Court's opinion in Newman, which he felt did not mandate the
adoption of a particular formula. 10 Third, he chided the major-
ity for adopting formulas for use in determining separate shares
of property because such appellate level formulations discourage
trial court discretion.'7
The Brandenburg formula does expand prior formulations
because it provides more complete definitions of both marital
and separate contributions. Despite this addition of detail, the
formula retains the most essential characteristic of earlier formu-
lations because it looks to the source of the funds used to acquire
property. Brandenburg is less an abandonment of Robinson than
a refinement of it. Further, its refinements are dictated by case
law which permits courts to trace separate property. 108
Appellate level courts are correctly concerned with preserv-
ing trial court discretion in the division of marital property. 19
10 Brandenburgv. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 873.
04 Id.
5 Id. at 875 (Cudgel, J., concurring).
10 6 Id.
'orId.
108 See Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). A spouse who used
traceable, nonmarital funds to reduce a mortgage or to fund an improvement could also
be entitled to the increased property value under a statutory argument. The increased
property value attributable to improvements made with nonmarital funds could be re-
garded as property acquired in exchange for the traceable, nonmarital funds. See KBS §
403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980). Kentucky appellate opinions have generally regarded im-
provements made with marital funds as marital property. Sharp v. Sharp, 491 S.W.2d at
644. The sole difference in treatment of improvements made with nonmarital funds is that
the claimant spouse has the burden of proof to show that the expended funds were non-
marital. KRS § 403.190(3) (Cune. Supp. 1980). At times a spouse may have difficulty trac-
ing nonmarital funds. See Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
109 See Herron v. Herron, 573 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1978).
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That discretion, however, is not all encompassing. The divorce
statute calls for division of marital property in "just proportions
considering all relevant factors," including those dictated by sta-
tute and excluding marital misconduct. u0 Yet a trial court has no
similar discretion when determining whether an asset is marital
or separate. The definitional section of the statute does not incor-
porate any language mandating discretion."' The majority in
Brandenburg recognized this distinction when it noted that it
would not prohibit other methods of property division as long as
the adopted method established a relationship between the con-
tributions of the parties to the property. 2
In spite of some dissatisfaction with the present formulation,
it is unlikely that the Kentucky Supreme Court would overrule
this state's prior cases in favor of an alternative approach to the
characterization of separate and marital property. Even though
the proportionality rule depends on the court's own interpreta-
tion of the word "property"" as used in the statute, and is not,
therefore, statutorily mandated, several factors militate against
wholesale change. Not the least of these factors is respect for pre-
cedent. In addition, abandonment of the proportionality rule
would force the court to consider an inception of title rule under
which the character of property as separate or marital would be
determined as of the time of acquisition and would thereafter re-
main immutable. 1 The inception of title rule has been criticized
110 KRS § 403.190(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
111 See KRS § 403.190(2) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
112 617 S.W.2d at 873. Judge Gudgel complained that the Brandenburg formula was
not mandated by the Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion in Newman. Id. at 875 (Cudgel,
J., concurring). Although the precise Newman issue was the propriety of a maintenance
award, the statutory schemes for property division and maintenance are so interrelated
that a correct award of maintenance depends upon correct property division. A spouse
seeking maintenance must demonstrate that he or she lacks sufficient property appor-
tioned to him or her to meet his or her reasonable needs. KRS § 403.200 (Cum. Supp.
1980).
113 See Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d at 181. In Robinson the court defined the
term property as used in KtiS § 403.190 (Cum. Supp. 1980) to mean equity. Id.
114 For example, a spouse in an inception of title jurisdiction retains as his or her sep-
arate property real estate purchased before the date of marriage even though the real
estate is subject to a substantial indebtedness reduced after marriage. See Cain v. Cain,
536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 506 P.2d 775 (N.M. 1973);
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for ignoring the shared enterprise or partnership theory of mar-
riage. If marriage is viewed as a partnership, critics argue, then
both the marital and separate estates should profit proportion-
ately when equity is acquired in real property. 115
Although Kentucky's rule requiring proportionality may
raise problems for future trial courts," 6 it is preferable to the in-
ception of title rule.li7 Both Kentucky case law"8 and its adoption
of the UMDA"9 evidence an intention to treat marriage as a
shared enterprise and to maintain the necessary flexibility re-
quired to deal with the changing equities that are involved in
thousands of divorce cases each year. The present rule, which
looks to the source of the funds used to acquire an asset, accom-
plishes that objective while maintaining flexibility in the actual
award of marital property.
III. CmLD CUSTODY
Child custody disputes affect nearly one million children
Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). For an explanation of the rule's an-
tecedents, see W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAuGm, PfINC ipLs OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 130-33
(2d ed. 1971). The non-owner spouse may retain a claim to reimbursement for some por-
tion of the marital funds expended. 536 S.W.2d at 875.
115 See generally Recent Cases, Dissolution of Marriage Division of Property which
has Increased in Value, 42 Mo. L. REv. 479, 485 (1977). It is possible, at least in theory,
for a spouse in an inception of title jurisdiction to receive a larger award than a Kentucky
spouse whose award proceeded from the source of the funds rule. An inception of title
spouse would only have to receive a larger percentage as reimbursement than the percent-
age the Kentucky spouse received as marital property.
116 One major problem with the current formulation is that it does not account for
varying rates of inflation. The formula assumes that the proportion of the asset attribut-
able to inflationary increase and that due to increases from joint efforts remains constant.
117 The real difference between the two rules lies in the amount of flexibility avail-
able to the court. For example, under the Kentucky rule a court need not award the prop-
erty to the purchasing spouse. However, a court in an inception of title state would be re-
quired to award the marital home to the purchasing spouse even though custody of minor
children was to be awarded to the nonpurchasing spouse. Kentucky allows the courts to
consider the "desirability of awarding the family home.., to the spouse having custody
of any children." KRS § 403.190(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1980).
118 Even before Kentucky's adoption of the UMDA, Kentucky courts had adopted
the partnership view of the marital relationship in Colley v. Colley, 460 S.W.2d at 821.
For examples of Kentucky decisions applying the proportionality rule, see note 90 supra.
119 For a list of other jurisdictions which have adopted the UMDA, see note 1 supra.
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every year. 120 The courts, which have the burdensome task of de-
termining the futures of children, take into account a variety of
psychological and socio-economic factors. The underlying prin-
ciple applied in a custody case is: "What will be in the child's best
interest?""1
A. Jurisdiction
Every year, thousands of children are moved from state to
state, family to family, while their parents wage custodial battles
in the courts. 1 Children needing stability in their environment
are seriously harmed by these conflicts. For years laws did noth-
ing to deter this practice and actually facilitated it.'2 Claimants
could sue in the courts of any state where the child was physically
present to seek custody or modification of a prior custody decree,
notwithstanding a pending action in another state. 121 This confu-
12 0 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF ORGANIZATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, AMERICAS
CHILDREN 1976, at 61 (1976).
12 1 The "best interests of the child" standard is the prevailing standard in the United
States today. UMDA § 402 commissioners' note, 9A U.L.A. 197 (1979). KRS § 403.270(1)
(Cum. Supp. 1980) specifically enumerates a list of factors that must be considered by trial
courts in determining an award of custody. Such factors include: the desires of both the
child and parents; the child's interaction with his parents, siblings, and any other person
in close contact with the child; the child's adjustment to his home, school, and commu-
nity; and the mental and physical health of the child and the proposed custodian. Id. For a
recent decision applying these factors, see Stafford v. Stafford, 618 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1981).
Courts in the following states give consideration to the child's wishes: Alaska,
Arizona, Connecticut, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington,
and Wisconsin. Freed & Foster, supra note 24, at 262. While KRS § 403.270 (Cum. Supp.
1980) does not specify any age limit, several states require that a child attain a certain age
before his choice of parent is entitled to any weight (for example, Georgia (14 or older);
New Mexico (14 or older); Ohio (12 or older)). Freed & Foster, supra note 24, at 262.
122 UCCJA commissioners' prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979).
123 Id. at 112. The United States Supreme Court, in Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610
(1947), held that full faith and credit need not be given to sister state child custody decrees.
A sister state "has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment [of another state in
custody matters], to qualify it, or to depart from it as does the State where it was ren-
dered." Id. at 615.
124 Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdic-
tion Under the UCCIA, 14 F m. L.Q. 203, 203 (1981). Kentucky was among those states
wherein the basis of jurisdiction hinged on the bona fide residence or domicile of the child
in the state. R..PETRILLI, KENTUCKY FAMILY LAW § 26.1 (1969).
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sion led a majority of states, including Kentucky, 121 to adopt the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 12 This Act is
designed to promote interstate cooperation in matters of child
custody, to discourage continuing controversies over child cus-
tody, and to deter child snatching, thus promoting a stable en-
vironment for the child. 12
Despite the fact that the UCCJA is aimed at promoting "in-
terstate stability in custody awards,"128 the Kentucky Supreme
Court, in Shumaker v. Paxton,29 viewed the Act as providing
guidance in intra-state custody disputes as well. 13° The parties,
after obtaining a decree of dissolution in Union County, Ken-
tucky, established residence in McCracken County, Kentucky.'
A petition for a modification of the existing child custody decree
to allow for joint custody was filed by the husband in Mc-
Cracken County. 13 Rejecting the wife's contentions that continu-
ing and exclusive jurisdiction attaches to the circuit court making
the initial custody determination,' a Justice Aker-writing for a
15 KRS §§ 403.400-.630 (Cum. Supp. 1980). Prior to 1980, the Kentucky General
Assembly had only adopted § 3 of the UCCJA. See KES § 403.260 (1972) (repealed 1980)
(pertaining to jurisdictional matters). KS § 403.260 (1972) was almost identical to § 3 of
the Act except that the provision giving jurisdiction over an absent child whose home was
within the state six months prior to the commencement of proceedings was deleted by the
1976 legislature. In 1980 the entire Uniform Act was passed by the legislature. KBS §
403.260 (1972) was thereby repealed and replaced by KRS § 403.420 (Cum. Supp. 1980)
which again includes the "home state within six (6) months" clause.
12 As of 1980, approximately 42 states had adopted the Act into law. Those jurisdic-
tions which have not done so include: Massachusetts, New Mexico, Texas, West Virginia,
South Carolina, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Freed & Foster, supra note 24,
at 259.
127 Id. See also UCCJA commissioners' prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 111, 114 (1979).
For a critical analysis of the jurisdictional provisions of the Act and conflicting interpreta-
tions, see Bates & Holmes, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: Progress and Pit-
falls, 17 GA. ST. B.J. 72 (1980); Bodenheimer, supra note 124.
12 UCCJA commissioners' prefatory note (1979), 9 U.L.A. 111, 113 (1979) (empha-
sis added).
129 613 S.W.2d 130 (Ky. 1981).
130 Id. at 132. The authors have found no other decision in which a court relied on
the Act to resolve intrastate custody disputes.
131 Id. at 131.
132 For a full discussion of custody arrangements and their impact on children, see
Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 271 (1978-79). See also Freed & Foster, Joint Custody:
Legislative Reform, 16 TRiAL 22 (1980).
13 613 S.W.2d at 131.
134 The theory of continuing and exclusive jurisdiction was first enunciated in
McNees v. McNees, 30 S.W. 207 (Ky. 1895). In McNees, the Court held that jurisdiction
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unanimous court-found that no statute prohibited the Mc-
Cracken Circuit Court from assuming jurisdiction of the case, es-
pecially since all of the parties and most of the evidence were in
McCracken County.',"
The Shumaker holding parallels decisions in cases involving
choice of jurisdiction among different states. Once the custodial
parent and child take up residence in another state the noncus-
todial parent often institutes modification proceedings in the
state of original jurisdiction. No easy solution is available to aid
the courts in preventing the noncustodial parent from thereby
enjoying an unfair advantage.,1 However, if the facts are such
that the new home state has optimum access to relevant evidence
for determining what is in the child's best interest, the forum
state should decline to exercise jurisdiction.3 7 In one recent Ken-
tucky case, Williams v. Williams,is th1 e court of appeals relin-
quished its jurisdiction to the new home state of the child and
custodial parent under the doctrine of forum non conveniens 39
The Williams decision is consistent with the purpose of the
UCCJA provision governing jurisdiction in child custody mat-
attaches to the circuit court once a custody determination is made, and that the court will
not lose jurisdiction for purposes of modifying its order until the child reaches the age of
majority. Id. at 207. As noted by the Court in Shumaker, case law and statutory law have
largely eroded this doctrine. 613 S.W.2d at 131. See Honigsberg v. Goad, 550 S.W.2d 471
(Ky. 1976) (court cannot retain jurisdiction over custody of children indefinitely even if
original custody order states otherwise); Turley v. Griffin, 508 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1974) (re-
moval of child from forum state divested state of jurisdiction due to insufficient contacts).
135 613 S.W.2d at 132. At the time of this action, all parties lived in McCracken
County and had done so for over two years. Id. at 131.
The legitimacy of the Court's analysis is demonstrated in the situation where the
parties, after litigating child custody in one county, move to another county across the
state. The Court declared: "There could be little, if any, justification in requiring the par-
ties to travel the length of the state to litigate a custody modification matter." Id. at 132.
Further support can be found in the commissioners7 note to § 3 of the UCCJA which
states: "[J]urisdiction exists only if it is in the child's interest, not merely the interest or con-
venience of the feuding parties, to determine custody in a particular state. The interest of
the child is served when the forum has optimum access to relevant evidence about thp
child and family." UCCJA § 3 commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. 122,124 (1979).
138 UCCJA § 3 commissioners' note, 9 U.L.A. at 123 (1979).
137 Id. See also Turley v. Griffin, 508 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1974). See note 135 supra for
a discussion of the commissioners' emphasis on the courts' relative access to evidence.
138 611 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
139 Id. at 809. Other state courts have refused jurisdiction under the doctrine of
forum non convenfens. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 546 P.2d 1104 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). Cf.
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ters, that is, to "limit jurisdiction rather than to proliferate it."'' 4
Therefore, "maximum rather than minimum contact with the
state" is required.'"
In contrast to the Williams situation, there are instances
when the custodial parent is given an unfair advantage if the
noncustodial parent's local court is made unavailable.' Jurisdic-
tion may be exercised by the original court in such a case. Under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the facts of each case must
be considered, and while a refusal to exercise jurisdiction is ap-
propriate or even necessary in some cases, that is not always so.
For instance, if the custodial parent attempts to frustrate visita-
tion rights in a court in the new home state, the noncustodial
parent should have the opportunity to utilize the courts in the
state of original jurisdiction to reaffirm his or her visitation rights
or even to request a change of custody if the grounds are serious
enough."" Otherwise, the noncustodial parent can do little to
prevent loss of all contact with the child. 144
B. Sexual Preference
In determining the best environment for a child, courts are
confronted with unusual problems in child custody disputes in-
Siegel v. Siegel, 417 N.E.2d 1312 (Ii. 1981) (recognized validity of using doctrine of
forum non conveniens but refused jurisdiction on other statutory grounds).
See also KRS § 403.460 (Cum. Supp. 1980). This statutory section, identical to §
7 of the UCCJA, concerns considerations of a convenient forum in custody disputes. De-
spite the fact that this section was not in effect at the time of this action, the Williams
court applied the theory of the section. Factors considered by the Williams court in declin-
ing jurisdiction included: (1) the children were not present in Kentucky; (2) one child had
completed a year of schooling in the new home state of New Hampshire; (3) New Hamp-
shire had assumed jurisdiction in the matter; and (4) evidence concerning the children's
best interest was best obtained in New Hampshire. 611 S.W.2d at 809.
140 Turley v. Griffin, 508 S.W.2d at 766 (citing the UCCJA).
14 Id.
142 Bodenheimer, supra note 124, at 222.
14 Id.
144 Id. at 222-23. But cf. Siegel v. Siegel, 417 N.E.2d 1312. In Siegel, the mother,
after moving out of the forum state with the child, applied for modification of the child-
visitation provisions in the new home state of California. The Illinois Supreme Court,
while noting the inconvenience and expense placed on the father by having to litigate in
California, held that California was the proper forum for determining child custody mat-
ters. Id. at 1319.
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volving a homosexual parent. 45 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
addressed such a problem in S. v. S. ,146 which involved a father's
bid for modification of a divorce decree which had vested child
custody with the lesbian mother. Less than one year after the
parents had obtained the divorce, the mother became involved in
a homosexual relationship.147 The court found that "[tihe extent
of the relationship included working at a lesbian bar, moving the
female companion into the house with the child, and exchanging
vows and rings with the friend in a mock wedding ceremony at
the wife's place of employment."'18 The appellate court, in re-
versing the circuit court's denial of modification, held that the
mother's lesbianism was sufficient, on the facts presented, to
warrant a change in custody.149 Nevertheless, the court refused to
145 In recent years a number of articles have been written on this subject. For a com-
prehensive background on the lesbian factor in custody disputes, see Armanno, The Les-
bian Mother: Her Right to Child Custody, 4 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 1 (1973); Hunter &
Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigating Strategy, 25
BuFFALo L. REv. 691 (1976); Comment, Bezio v. Patenaude: The "Coming Out" Custody
Controversy of Lesbian Mothers in Court, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 331 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Bezio]; Comment, Custody: Lesbian Mothers in the Courts, 16 GoNz.
L. REv. 147 (1980).
146 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
147 Id. at 65. "Normally, the mother obtains custody after divorce and the lesbian
factor emerges when the father later petitions for a custody modification. The basis for
modification of the initial custody agreement is 'substantial change in circumstances'."
Comment, Bezio, supra note 145, at 339.
The absence of statistical data on how parental homosexuality influences custody
decisions is due in large part to the minimal documentation of such cases. "[Tlhe issue is
rarely mentioned above the level of a whisper, and the few cases that reach the appellate
level are almost always ordered excluded from official and unofficial reports." Armanno,
supra note 145, at 5.
148 608 S.W.2d at 65.
149 Id. A growing number of courts are retreating from the traditional view that a
lesbian mother is unfit per se and are focusing on homosexuality as only one factor to be
considered in determining the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Nadler v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. Rptr. 352 (Ct. App. 1967); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass.
1980); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Schuster v. Schus-
ter, 585 P.2d 130 (Wash. 1978).
It is interesting to note the lack of custody cases involving homosexual fathers.
Few reported decisions allow a homosexual father to retain custody. See, e.g., A. v. A.,
514 P.2d 358 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (homosexual father was allowed to maintain custody of
his two sons). However, custody in A. v. A. was conditioned on the father not living with
his homosexual companion. See also In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1974), afffd, 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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find a lesbian mother unfit per se.so
KRS section 403.340 prohibits changing custodywithin two
years following a decree unless the situation is one in which the
child's environment may endanger his or her physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health. 151 The court of appeals observed that
the statute prescribes a "potentiality for.., danger" test that
does not require courts "to wait until the damage is done. ''2 In
examining the nexus between a parent's sexual preference and its
potential harmful effect on the "best interests" of the child, 10 the
court in S. v. S. relied in part upon the observations and recom-
mendations of a court-appointed psychologist. The psychologist
concluded that the father should be awarded custody because
otherwise the child "'may have difficulties in achieving a fulfill-
ing heterosexual identity of her own in the future.' ,,s The court
150 608 S.W.2d at 65. For further discussion, see note 149 supra and the accompany-
ing text. But cf. Immerman v. Immerman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 298, 301 (Ct. App. 1959) (homo-
sexuality was material consideration); Newsome v. Newsome, 256 S.E.2d 849 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1979).
See also In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (court returned
custody of the child to the father). While the court did not go so far as to find the mother
unfit as a matter of law, it did, however, hold that "the home environment with her
homosexual partner in residence [was] not a proper atmosphere in which to bring up this
child or in the best interest of this child." Id. at 858. In a number of recent cases the cus-
tody rights of a lesbian mother have been maintained on the condition that she not live to-
gether with her homosexual partner. See, e.g., Townsend v. Townsend, [1974-75] 1 FAm.
L. BE. (BNA) 2830 (Portage County, Ohio, Ct. C.P. Mar. 14,1975).
151 KES § 403.340(1) (Curn. Supp. 1980) provides in pertinent part:
No motion to modify a custody decree may be made earlier than two
years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of affi-
davits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may en-
danger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
The purpose of this statutory section is to maximize the finality and conclusiveness of child
custody judgments so as to provide custodial continuity for the child without jeopardizing
the interests of the child. The person seeking the modification must overcome a presump-
tion in favor of the present custodian. UMDA § 409 commissioners' note 9A U.L.A. 211,
212 (1979). See Wilcherv. Wilcher, 566 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
152 608 S.W.2d at 65. As stated by the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
We do not perceive that [the] word ["may") connotes that the injury to the
"physical, mental, moral or emotional health" must have already occurred
or be occurring at the present time. The potentiality for such danger is the
test and the courts are not required to wait until the damage is done.
Id.
11 For further discussion of the best interest analysis, see note 121 supra and the ac-
companying text.
Is 608 S.W.2d at 66. See also In re Jane B., 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (court justified its
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noted, in deciding in favor of the father, "that the lesbianism of
the mother, because of the failure of the community to accept
and support such a condition, forces on the child a need for se-
crecy and the isolation imposed by such a secret, thus separating
the child from his or her peers."'-"
The court of appeals in S. v. S. failed to explain fully the fac-
tors that sustained the conclusion that parental homosexuality
would be likely to affect the child.156 Since the decision did not
state a clear legal standard for deciding future custody disputes
in which one parent is a homosexual, the opinion cannot be con-
sidered a landmark decision. The case may merely be another
example of judicial bias against lesbian mothers.
modification order, on the basis of expert testimony). As pointed out by the court-
appointed psychologist in S. v. S., there is no empirical data to substantiate the theory that
children are more likely to be adversely affected when raised in a homosexual household.
608 S.W.2d at 66. For an in-depth analysis of the psychiatrist's role in the lesbian child
custody process, see Comment, Bezio, supra note 145, at 348-54.
155 608 S.W.2d at 66. This language intimates the court's bias against the mother's
lesbianism. As one commentator pointed out:
In order to minimize the prejudicial effects surrounding judicial homo-
phobic attitudes, there should be a requirement that all findings of fact be
recorded in detail in the record. This requirement would operate as a safe-
guard against judicial carelessness in custody suits involving lesbian
mothers ... [and would serve to protect] those who may be subject to judi-
cial bias.
Comment, Bezio, supra note 145, at 344.
Cf. Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d at 1216. In Bezio, the court stated that"[t]he
State may not deprive parents of custody of their children'simply because their households
fail to meet the ideals approved by the community... [or] simply because the parents
embrace ideologies or pursue life-styles at odds with the average."' Id. (quoting Custody
of a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Mass. 1979)).
156 For a further discussion of these factors, see the text accompanying note 148
supra.
